[ALSC-Forum] RE: Options A,B,C

[DannyYounger]

I have been thinking about Karl's comments...

Each of the three models put forward for consideration allow the Supporting 
Organizations to elect Board Directors.   One has to wonder why this should 
this necessarily be the case.   There are some that argue that these groups 
already wield enough power.   Others will likewise argue that those that 
ICANN considers to be "stakeholders" (groups that have entered into a 
contractual relationship with our corporation) are in fact being treated like 
"stockholders", rather than as the "contractors" that they truly are. 

Some might say that what ICANN terms "supporting organizations" or 
"constituencies" are what the rest of us refer to as  "special interest 
groups". Can we justify lobbyists for these groups being granted seats on the 
Board of a public-benefit corporation?  Most of us would undoubtably prefer 
having policy decisions made by publicly-elected officials of our own 
choosing, rather than by representatives appointed by groups such as 
Microsoft, AOL, AT&T, MGM, WorldCom, Cisco or VeriSign.  So why should we 
assume that these contractors and other special interest groups will be 
assured seats on the Board?  

I guess the answer lies in the fact that our reigning decision-makers are the 
ones that must vote upon the recommendations put forth by the ALSC.  As such, 
we enter into the realm of expedient compromise, and the ALSC must chart a 
course of action that has a reasonable chance of being accepted by a Board 
vote. While the study may be touted as a "clean-sheet", and while conclusions 
reached might even rise to the level of consensus, in the final analysis the 
ALSC understands that the Board will act only on the basis of whatever the 
Board perceives to be "in the best interest of the Corporation".   

At the moment, that "best interest" seems to be promoting a cash flow that 
would ensure a financially healthy and stable Corporation, which means 
granting Board seats to those that pay to play, and inducing them to pay even 
more (this probably explains why option B shows registries/registrars gaining 
a seat at the expense of the PSO, and why option C gives Board-electing 
rights to groups such as the RSO and NSO).   

Continuing along these lines, it occurs to me that even though it would be 
possible to transfer all payment responsibilities from the registrars to the 
registries, (and although this was scheduled to come to pass in the 
reasonably near future), this will probably not happen if negotiations can 
allow for registrar Board representation in exchange for a higher registrar 
fee structure (the price of admission).  

Theoretical discussions about structure are all well and good, but those 
plans that fatten the corporate coffers are the plans that have the best 
chance of being accepted by our Board. I would expect to see options that 
provide seats for the Telcoms that will soon milk the ENUM cash cow, and 
options that can cement contracts with the ISPs. 

As long as these initiatives to financially strengthen the corporation can be 
balanced by a resolve to serve the public through an equal degree of Board 
representation for @Large Directors, then I see no problem moving forward 
along the lines that have thus far been presented.  

Danny Younger