[ALSC-Forum] Notes on At Large Options

[Thomas Roessler]

I'll try to summarize some notes on the various at large options. 
Some of this is fall-out from discussions with Alexander Svensson, 
and some of the thoughts were actually prompted by reading Esther 
Dyson's Release 2.1.  (Which is, by the way, highly recommended 
reading since it gives some hints at the kind of mindset behind 
ICANN's current structure, I think.)

First, let me list some things which just won't work:

- Collecting money from individuals all over the world (like in 
   Option C).  As Alexander pointed out on this list already, it's 
   kind of hard to find the right amount of money.  Let's face it: 
   What some of us pay for Internet access may be sufficient for 
   supporting a family in other parts of the world.  Thus, a 
   representation scheme which is "pay to vote" would be perceived 
   as politically incorrect, and would draw considerable fire from 
   various sources.

   (Also, as Vittorio noted, customers are obviously the ones who 
   ultimately pay the domain name industry...)

- Require a "willingness to serve" from at large members (once again 
   Option C).  While this may be intended to be some competence 
   test, it just doesn't work out.  Being willing to serve on the 
   board doesn't mean you're competent, and being competent doesn't 
   have to imply that you want to serve on the board, or even 
   consider yourself suitable for that job.

- Prevent SOs from nominating candidates (ups, Option C again), but 
   let individuals nominate them.  Obviously, individuals affiliated 
   with SOs could still nominate "SO candidates".  Thus, in order to 
   get "actual at large nominations", you'd have to perform global 
   primaries, which basically means that you shift the logistical and 
   organisatorial problems from the elections to the primaries.

- Enforcing "issue-based" parties (Option A).  Just look at parties 
   in real life: The more successful ones are rarely issue-based - 
   and issue-based parties which turn successful lose their 
   issue-centric approach.  You just won't be able to prevent a party 
   "for the welfare of country X's industry/interests" from coming to 
   existence.

That is, I don't think that Option C will work at all (in 
particular, it won't produce adequate representation of "At Large 
Members"), I don't think that Option A will work as designed, and 
I'm not sure about Option B.

Option D looks so complicated that I (1) don't want to look at it in 
detail, and (2) don't think it would ever be practicable.


But anyway, before we start thinking about the individual options, 
some overall idea of the direction ICANN should take would be a nice 
thing to have - and this idea seems to be lacking.

There seem to be two extreme directions ICANN could take, and both 
don't look desirable:

1. Pure industry self-regulation.  This is not acceptable when we 
come to regulatory realms which traditionally belong to states - 
such as the legal framework for relations between customers (think 
UDRP), or anti-trust regulation (think NSI contracts).  In
particular, ICANN does not play on any regulatory market, but is in 
fact acting as a monopoly on that market.

2. Practically re-building a classical state, and trying to solve 
about everything by a "one man one vote" scheme.  This may be the 
classical solution to the representation problems we are facing, and 
it can certainly be helpful to look at this solution for direction. 
However, there is no reason to expect a "world government formerly 
called ICANN" to work more smoothly, more efficiently, or in a more 
integer or transparent manner than any existing government.  This 
approach would also be a direct contradiction to the privatization 
mantra behind ICANN's creation (keep the governments out of the 
Internet).

I'd almost bet that both approaches would lead to a break-down of 
ICANN's authority, and of ICANN's support by usual governments. 
Both are options which, I believe, shouldn't be used.


Maybe a look at the _functions_ of the various layers of ICANN's 
current structure can provide at least some guidance:

The SOs are supposed to be the place where consensus is developed. 
This does, in particular, imply that the ICANN process can't 
currently yield any consensus which includes individual users - 
these aren't properly represented in the SO structure.  It does, in 
turn, imply that individual users will need representation within 
the SO structure if the current consensus and SO process is supposed 
to persist in some manner or another.  Note that this is independent 
of the question whether or not or how individual users are 
represented on the board.  Also, a perception that the SOs are less 
legitimate than the board may be damaging to ICANN's internal 
equilibrium (as far as it exists).

The board is supposed to be a controlling and executive body, which 
partially balances the SOs, and in practice even absorbs some of 
their functions.  This body must be balanced internally. No group of 
stakeholders should be excluded from the board.  The idea that 
supply and customer sides should be balanced on the board is nice, 
but bears some problems - in particular, registrars are on both 
sides.


Of course, this structure won't survive anyway: The ccSO is possibly 
about to shot the current consensus-building process on DNS matters 
to pieces (as far as it exists), and consensus-building is moving to 
the board level - which would make balanced representation of 
interests on the board even more crucial...


Finally, let me point to one thing of Option C which I really like: 
The "non-blocking, paper-passing" body through which any policy 
proposal must pass before it comes to the board level.  This body, 
as I understand it, would examine a proposed policy, and state 
whether or not the proposal actually has the necessary consensus. 
The board could still accept a non-consensus policy, but would have 
to answer lots of questions, and possibly jeopardize its legitimacy.


All these are really just thought fragments.  I hope you find at 
least some of them helpful.
-- 
Thomas Roessler                        http://log.does-not-exist.org/