Re: [ALSC-Forum] Notes on At Large Options

[Esther Dyson]

thanks for the compliment, but for better or worse I had little to do with 
ICANN's current structure. I *do* plead responsible for option B, 
however...!

And thanks for some specific comments. Now we need to figure out what 
*will* work....

Esther

At 07:52 AM 8/7/2001, Thomas Roessler wrote:

>I'll try to summarize some notes on the various at large options. Some of 
>this is fall-out from discussions with Alexander Svensson, and some of the 
>thoughts were actually prompted by reading Esther Dyson's Release 
>2.1.  (Which is, by the way, highly recommended reading since it gives 
>some hints at the kind of mindset behind ICANN's current structure, I think.)
>
>First, let me list some things which just won't work:
>
>- Collecting money from individuals all over the world (like in   Option 
>C).  As Alexander pointed out on this list already, it's   kind of hard to 
>find the right amount of money.  Let's face it:   What some of us pay for 
>Internet access may be sufficient for   supporting a family in other parts 
>of the world.  Thus, a   representation scheme which is "pay to vote" 
>would be perceived   as politically incorrect, and would draw considerable 
>fire from   various sources.
>
>   (Also, as Vittorio noted, customers are obviously the ones 
> who   ultimately pay the domain name industry...)
>
>- Require a "willingness to serve" from at large members (once 
>again   Option C).  While this may be intended to be some 
>competence   test, it just doesn't work out.  Being willing to serve on 
>the   board doesn't mean you're competent, and being competent 
>doesn't   have to imply that you want to serve on the board, or 
>even   consider yourself suitable for that job.
>
>- Prevent SOs from nominating candidates (ups, Option C again), but   let 
>individuals nominate them.  Obviously, individuals affiliated   with SOs 
>could still nominate "SO candidates".  Thus, in order to   get "actual at 
>large nominations", you'd have to perform global   primaries, which 
>basically means that you shift the logistical and   organisatorial 
>problems from the elections to the primaries.
>
>- Enforcing "issue-based" parties (Option A).  Just look at parties   in 
>real life: The more successful ones are rarely issue-based -   and 
>issue-based parties which turn successful lose their   issue-centric 
>approach.  You just won't be able to prevent a party   "for the welfare of 
>country X's industry/interests" from coming to   existence.
>
>That is, I don't think that Option C will work at all (in particular, it 
>won't produce adequate representation of "At Large Members"), I don't 
>think that Option A will work as designed, and I'm not sure about Option B.
>
>Option D looks so complicated that I (1) don't want to look at it in 
>detail, and (2) don't think it would ever be practicable.
>
>
>But anyway, before we start thinking about the individual options, some 
>overall idea of the direction ICANN should take would be a nice thing to 
>have - and this idea seems to be lacking.
>
>There seem to be two extreme directions ICANN could take, and both don't 
>look desirable:
>
>1. Pure industry self-regulation.  This is not acceptable when we come to 
>regulatory realms which traditionally belong to states - such as the legal 
>framework for relations between customers (think UDRP), or anti-trust 
>regulation (think NSI contracts).  In
>particular, ICANN does not play on any regulatory market, but is in fact 
>acting as a monopoly on that market.
>
>2. Practically re-building a classical state, and trying to solve about 
>everything by a "one man one vote" scheme.  This may be the classical 
>solution to the representation problems we are facing, and it can 
>certainly be helpful to look at this solution for direction. However, 
>there is no reason to expect a "world government formerly called ICANN" to 
>work more smoothly, more efficiently, or in a more integer or transparent 
>manner than any existing government.  This approach would also be a direct 
>contradiction to the privatization mantra behind ICANN's creation (keep 
>the governments out of the Internet).
>
>I'd almost bet that both approaches would lead to a break-down of ICANN's 
>authority, and of ICANN's support by usual governments. Both are options 
>which, I believe, shouldn't be used.
>
>
>Maybe a look at the _functions_ of the various layers of ICANN's current 
>structure can provide at least some guidance:
>
>The SOs are supposed to be the place where consensus is developed. This 
>does, in particular, imply that the ICANN process can't currently yield 
>any consensus which includes individual users - these aren't properly 
>represented in the SO structure.  It does, in turn, imply that individual 
>users will need representation within the SO structure if the current 
>consensus and SO process is supposed to persist in some manner or 
>another.  Note that this is independent of the question whether or not or 
>how individual users are represented on the board.  Also, a perception 
>that the SOs are less legitimate than the board may be damaging to ICANN's 
>internal equilibrium (as far as it exists).
>
>The board is supposed to be a controlling and executive body, which 
>partially balances the SOs, and in practice even absorbs some of their 
>functions.  This body must be balanced internally. No group of 
>stakeholders should be excluded from the board.  The idea that supply and 
>customer sides should be balanced on the board is nice, but bears some 
>problems - in particular, registrars are on both sides.
>
>
>Of course, this structure won't survive anyway: The ccSO is possibly about 
>to shot the current consensus-building process on DNS matters to pieces 
>(as far as it exists), and consensus-building is moving to the board level 
>- which would make balanced representation of interests on the board even 
>more crucial...
>
>
>Finally, let me point to one thing of Option C which I really like: The 
>"non-blocking, paper-passing" body through which any policy proposal must 
>pass before it comes to the board level.  This body, as I understand it, 
>would examine a proposed policy, and state whether or not the proposal 
>actually has the necessary consensus. The board could still accept a 
>non-consensus policy, but would have to answer lots of questions, and 
>possibly jeopardize its legitimacy.
>
>
>All these are really just thought fragments.  I hope you find at least 
>some of them helpful.
>--
>Thomas Roessler                        http://log.does-not-exist.org/



Esther Dyson			Always make new mistakes!
chairman, EDventure Holdings
writer, Release 3.0 (on Website below)
edyson@edventure.com
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