Re: [ALSC-Forum] Re: Query for Sims, Lynn and Dyson

[Jefsey Morfin]

Dear Joe,
your response is quite interesting. IMHO it really shows the we 
misunderstand each others over a no problem.

Please consider that English is not my mother tongue. No causticity desired 
here. .

On 16:39 28/10/01, Joe Sims said:
><snip>
>My personal view is that this "commitment," extracted as a form of
>political blackmail by a single official of a single government that
>happened to have some leverage at the moment, and clearly not
>representing anything remotely like a consensus position of the Internet
>community, is worth what its circumstances imply.  But the fact is that
>the Board tried very diligently, working within its obligation to make
>decisions based on community consensus, to find a way to carry out that
>commitment.  It created the MAC, solicited comments from the entire
>community, and came up with a suggested process that it thought
>accomplished the goal of broad user representation while minimizing
>capture and other problems.

What you seem to imply is that the BoD votes whatever is requested from it 
without any serious consideration as I observe that the 9 directors have 
been part of the ByLaws of this corporation.

>It became clear in Cairo that this proposal did not have consensus support.

I was not in Cairo. But I heard of it.
I am only interested in knowing how you can claim there was or not a 
consensus since half the intended board (@large) could not be polled on the 
matter. BTW there is no more consensus on the proposed ALSC position today.

>That resulted in the temporary election
>of five AL Board members and the creation of the ALSC, which has been
>searching for consensus ever since.  I will leave to your judgment
>whether that search has been successful, reminding you that consensus by
>definition cannot mean unanimity, or every participant would be able to
>veto a solution acceptable to the vast majority.

By definition consensus IS unanimity - not in a decision process (decision 
implying a split between alternatives, unanimity being a special case where 
one alternative has no support), but in an evaluation process where it is 
discovered that everyone agree. There may be some forms of rough consensus 
when actually everyone agree but either disagree on the formulation of the 
agreement or  for some obvious human reasons (fun, systematic opposition, 
derision). This is precisely the reason why a real veto is of use being 
understood that a veto is a serious affair.

Now current practice in our society evelution has certainly made the 
consensus notion to evolve and to become the "community correct" while more 
and more communities we share in are not adapted to votes. The consensus is 
then some living expression of the community pact and is always stronger 
than a common agreement. In any case it cannot be opposed by a part of the 
community and certainly never "enforced": this would disband the community. 
Today there is obviously no more consensus about @large than before.

The true questions are whose consensus is needed: consensus by everyone or 
consensus among the @large community. And consensus about what.

>Now, to return to the core of your question, there is nothing magic
>about 9 At Large Board members, just as there is nothing magic about 3
>each for the SO's.  All of these numbers are arbitrary.  The
>requirement, if ICANN is to function as it was hoped it would, is that
>all relevant stakeholders, including business and individual users, the
>technical community, the provider community (including the cc's) and all
>the other elements of the DNS stakeholder community, are appropriately
>represented throughout ICANN processes, including its Board.  If they
>are, ICANN may be able to effectively carry out its functions; if they
>are not -- either because one element is overweighted or another is
>underweighted -- ICANN will probably not function effectively.  In fact,
>ICANN is about the most open organization that can be imagined, in
>practically every way; those who complain about closed discussions of
>the GAC or the Board, or about too much staff involvement, either have
>cynical agendas or no practical appreciation of the necessary elements
>of operation of an entity like ICANN.  It is impossible for any entity
>to function without staff, and with never a private discussion; there is
>no functioning body in the world, including the representative bodies in
>the US (from which most of these complaints come) that functions any
>differently.

There is no magic about 9? I suppose Joe that you are not known as a 
brilliant lawyer without in some way being competent in constitutionalism. 
The ICANN Membership is obviously a problem for you I do not really 
understand why, probably because I am no American. Anyway the problem of 
the ICANN is to select Members of its Board in the most diversified and in 
the most representative way. Not in terms of democracy - I keep saying that 
I do not ask my telephone to be democratic but to work - but in term of 
competence, culture, interest and needs, concerns, etc... In such cases 
every constitutionalist in the world has a solution: make the stakeholders 
vote through different channels in order to get different types of 
representation. The US citizen who elect the Representatives and the 
Senators are the same, yet Congress and Senate are different. Now when it 
comes to final decision  the elected people roughly have the same weigh. 
This ensure stability and coherence to some extent and diversity. Conflicts 
are handled through a final preeminence or an arbitration.

The Internet is our consensus to interconnect our machines under TCP/IP 
using the IP and the domain naming plans. A governance (old French word the 
EEC recently published a White Book about) is the community managing a 
consensus. The Internet governance includes several poles of governance: 
ISOC, IETF, W3C, IAB, ICANN, inclusive roots, NICs, etc...  When you look 
in detail you see that this governance gathers a small number of 
participants which form the governance community. They share in one or 
several poles of governance. The ICANN chose to name them @large. Let keep 
the word but let note that they come from their interest in the Internet 
not in the ICANN.

Now let see how these people unite. They gather in dedicated structures. 
The ICANN names these constituencies. These @large individuals and their 
constituencies are the two governance building blocks. So naturally when 
you want to build a sound and stable organization using the experience of 
the Internet active participant community, you plan having your Board 
through a direct selection of @large and of indirectly elected people 
through the value added filter of their constituencies.
Then you may either give preeminence to one group - hardly feasible in a 
Board - or to introduce a moderating element, in the ICANN: the President.

When you have that - and we have it today, even if squatters makes the 
things unperfect - IMHO you keep it!  Unless you want fights over fights. 
May be this is what you want?

>My personal views are well known -- I think there should be user
>representation on ICANN's Board; I do not think that group or any other
>single element of ICANN stakeholders should be able to capture the
>organization or the Board, or be able to veto actions clearly preferred
>by the consensus of stakeholders; and I have serious doubts about the
>practical utility of selecting any ICANN Board members, representing any
>constituency, through massive direct elections of any group numbering in
>the millions or billions.

You have 9 direct and 9 indirect Directors, the President being a clever 
move. Why the devil do you want to consider such wild and absurd schemes? 
You get yourself a problem. Problems in human structures in most of the 
cases come from rigidities, so the structured do not adapt.

Let review the ICANN. You will observe that all its components are quite 
natural. The constituencies are natural thematic gatherings (' yet some are 
missing like registrants, individual users, DNS developers, may be SMEs). 
ccTLDs are ill at ease because they do not understand that they first are 
NICs, butthey adapt. GAC is clear thing, however a Consummation 
Consultative Committee is missing, RSSAC is neat. Other legal committees 
are OK. One really feels like the UN in your golf club (Santiago paper) but 
it is fine.

Now you have added the SOs. And IMHO all the problem comes from there. Not 
from the SO itself as it is an interesting concept. But from their 
rigidity. The Governance structured natural building block is the 
Constituency. You added the SO. One is to be the boss: you introduced 
conflicts and endless confusion and rigidity does not permit to solve the 
conflicts. Hence the blocking of the NC.

Now let simply decide that the SO are thematic constituency clubs. This 
means that constituencies do exist by their own (any reasonable group can 
be accepted by others) and may join as many SO as they need. You will see 
that quite all the problems are solved.

- no need to change the SOs. You keep them the way they are: one theme, one 
council, but with one GA open to everyone interested, the concerned 
constituencies as Members. 3 BoD.

- ccTLD will become what they are: NICs. They will share in the ASO and the 
DNSO. They will have heir own Alliance outside the ICANN as the W3C is 
outside the ICANN.

- all the participants into the GAs will form some kind of ICANN/GA. Don't 
put any council there it would be competition to the BoD, make hem also to 
share in the local governance and interact with the NICs. You will get your 
outreach and your international cohesion. NIC will animate and will protect 
against manipulations. Show the NIC they may be represented in many 
indirect ways. -obviously I would put the NICs as the true ICANN Members 
with powers to reveiw the budget and the general policy, but this is my pov).

Now, your problem is no more to discuss about BoD re partition but about 
elections system. You will get NIC representatives elected as well by ASO 
and PSO. If you have a good and fair system you will get individual users 
too through DNSO - ar at least partcipating. Through the GA you will get 
large corporations, ccTLDs as well ( look at Mr. Katho and Ni Quaynor).

What is emotional is about 9 is the balance. Everyone feel that the balance 
is of the essence. But linking it to a supposed form of unknown electors is 
not serious. Carl is a good Director, not because he is @large but because 
he is Carl. And he has been elected because he represents an apsect of the 
stakeholder. Through the same process which elected Katho.

You keep talking about millions or billions. I tried - I chair the only 
incorporated @large association and I am associated with four other non 
incorporated associations @large - the AFNIC tried, some opponent tried to 
gather people to be interested in the DNSO BoD election and to make some 
outreach. We got 40 people and only 10 voted!

I am sure that press would help, but nobody is interested in the ICANN. 
People are interested in an innovative network: ICANN killed that because 
it has taken a responsibility it has not. Let have the ccTLD discuss a 
geographical direct election system in their area, let refine the SOs. Let 
keep the existing situation and let think of something else.

ICANN is just a three pages Excel folder to manage. The rest is mission 
creep and problems.

>Any system that meets those criteria and
>deals with these issues is certainly within the range of alternatives
>that I (and I suspect many others) would find acceptable and workable,
>and more directly to your question would clearly meet the constitutional
>mandates set forth in the White Paper and elsewhere.  The fact that Karl
>Auerbach or Hans Klein, or Jeff Williams (assuming he really does
>exist), has a different view is not going to keep me up nights.

Joe, the fact that you have your own view is keeping up a lot of people 
around the world due to the impact the ICANN odd policy has, I am sure you 
realize that. Some day someone asked on the ccTLD list why they should care 
about the @large and a good response came: "because they can kick your ass 
out of your business".

You must understand that technically no one needs the ICANN. It is just a 
convenience. You are - rightly or not - associated to the fact that ICANN 
tries to be a dominance. This will lead to nowhere. From experience I know 
that ICANN needs 3 people no more to carry its really duties. But also that 
it is in an unique place to be catalyst and a kernel for serving many other 
things. Yet certainly not to lead them: coordinating something is 
centralizing. In a decentralized and distributed system it is a weakness 
and a point of failure. Like a sand castle. The network tide will swallow 
it....

Now, I am not sure at all Carl Auerbach and Jeff Williams would disagree 
with me. Hans, I do not kinow. I guess that when he as counted how many 
seat he could relate with he would be happy. You don't want anyone to grap 
the majority. Do you realy think you can in my scheme, while I see that to 
day groups have formed and there is a majority based upon non rational 
feelings. I must remind you that Carl is Member of the Board and when he 
disagrees this shows there is no consensus except by exclusion. You can pay 
no attention to it by artificial legal tricks, but the netwrok tide will 
not really pay attention to them...

I keep saying there are three interenet; yours the legal one, NSI the 
business one, and the real one by the Internet participants, and that data 
travel faster through datagrams than on yellow pages.... Frankly I think we 
have to consider them tree.

All the best. Sorry for the Frenglish
Jefsey